

Message Text

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QUOTE: S E C R E T CAIRO 13091

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TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, PBOR, EG, US, XF

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SADAT

REF: (A) STATE 122733, (B)STATE 125077, (C)CAIRO 12617

SUMMARY: IN TALK WITH SADAT AND VP MUBARAK TODAY RE
SUBSTANCE REFTELS, HE DID NOT RULE OUT DIRECT MEETING
WITH DAYAN IF ADEQUATE PRELIMINARY UNDERSTANDINGS HAVE
BEEN REACHED THAT SUCH DIRECT MEETING HOLDS PROMISE OF
ACHIEVING SOMETHING AND IS NOT JUST AN ISRAELI PUBLIC
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RELATIONS PLOY. SUCH DIRECT MEETING MIGHT BE IN EGYPT
OR OUTSIDE OF COUNTRY. SADAT EXPLAINED MUBARAK'S JUST
COMPLETED TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN HAD TWOFOLD
PURPOSE: FIRST, MUBARAK WAS TO DISCUSS ARMS CONTIN-
GENCIES IN EVENT U.S. ARMS PACKAGE FAILED. SECOND,
MUBARAK WAS TO URGE HUSSEIN ASSUME HIS RESPONSIBILITIES
AND PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON BASIS JOINT PROPOSAL
THAT ISRAEL RETURN WEST BANK TO JORDAN AND GAZA TO EGYPT
FOR FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THIS, SADAT
ARGUED, WOULD FOR NOW OBIVIATE PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINA-

TION OBSTACLE ALTHOUGH AT END FIVE-YEAR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD PALESTINIANS COULD OPT FOR THEIR OWN DESTINY IN TERMS OF SOME SORT OF A LINK WITH JORDAN. IF JORDAN WISHES, EGYPT WOULD BE WILLING JOIN WITH HUSSEIN IN NEGOTIATING WEST BANK, ALTHOUGH GOE IS NOT ASKING FOR THIS. ON BASIS MUBARAK REPORT, SADAT CLAIMED HUSSEIN AGREED "100 PERCENT," ESPECIALLY AFTER SAUDI ENDORSEMENT OF IDEA MADE KNOWN TO HIM. HUSSEIN STILL NEEDS BE PRESSED, HOWEVER, BY USG AND SAUDIS TO OVERCOME HIS TIMIDITY. PALESTINIANS, U.N. AND U.S. SHOULD ALSO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. AS "FOUNDATION" OF A USG PROPOSAL, SADAT SUGGESTED USG SHOULD URGE ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM LANDS OCCUPIED IN 1967 PROVIDED ALL PARTIES SIT WITH ISRAEL IN DIRECT TALKS IN ORDER TO AGREE ON MUTUAL SECURITY ISSUES. THOSE ELEMENTS OF 242 RE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND RIGHT OF ALL STATES TO LIVE IN SECURE BORDERS MIGHT ALSO BE MENTIONED. SO SHOULD NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAEL AND, FINALLY, USG SHOULD ANNOUNCE ITS READINESS USE ITS GOOD OFFICES WITH ALL PARTIES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT PEACE IN AREA, AND ITS INTENTION OF JOINING AS A PARTNER. SUCH PROPOSAL, SADAT SUGGESTED, WOULD MEAN BEGIN SELF-RULE PLAN NEED NOT BE DISCUSSED.

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HE HAD MENTIONED HIS IDEA TO WEIZMAN. LATTER, WHILE REJECTING ANNOUNCEMENT CONCEPT, HAD INDICATED ISRAELI INTEREST IN DISCUSSING SUBSTANCE. HIS STATEMENT TO WEIZMAN, SADAT BELIEVES, IS BASIS OF DAYAN'S CURRENT INTEREST IN HAVING DIRECT TALKS ON WEST BANK/GAZA. SADAT INDICATED MODIFIED DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES STILL NEEDED BEFORE WEST BANK/GAZA NEGOTIATIONS CAN BEGIN. SADAT DENIED HAVING OFFERED SIGN BILATERAL PEACE AGREEMENT, AS ISRAELIS ALLEGE. KAMEL, SADAT SAID, HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED PREPARE TWO PAPERS, ONE ELABORATING ON PREVIOUS EGYPTIAN WEST BANK/GAZA COUNTER-PROPOSAL AND THE SECOND SADAT'S LATEST IDEA AS SET FORTH ABOVE. PAPERS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ME TONIGHT AND CAN BE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELIS. END SUMMARY.

1. HAD HOUR LONG MEETING WITH SADAT THIS AFTERNOON. VP MUBARAK WAS WITH HIM. FONMIN KAMEL HAD MET WITH SADAT JUST BEFORE MY MEETING AND HAD BEEN GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS ON EGYPTIAN COUNTER PROPOSAL (SEE BELOW).

2. I FIRST CONVEYED TO SADAT CORRECTNESS OF HIS ASSUMPTION THAT DAYAN, WHILE IN WASHINGTON, EXPRESSED PREFERENCE TO PUT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES TEMPORARILY ASIDE AND WORK INSTEAD ON TRYING TO REACH AGREEMENT ON SPECIFICS OF A WEST BANK/GAZA PLAN. DAYAN, I NOTED, BELIEVES THAT IF PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON SUCH SPECIFICS, OUT OF THIS MIGHT FLOW SET OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON WHICH

THE TWO SIDES COULD AGREE. SADAT INTERJECTED THAT THIS IS WHAT HE ASSUMED. ISRAELIS, HE OBSERVED, ARE "SLY." I SAID WE UNDERSTAND LOGIC OF DAYAN'S PROPOSED APPROACH BUT HAD EMPHASIZED OUR IMPRESSION, BASED ON TALKS WITH SADAT, REMAINS THAT GOE REGARDS DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AS FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS. HENCE, AGREEMENT ON A DECLARATION MUST REMAIN ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. I ALSO TOLD HIM OF OUR WILLINGNESS HANDLE HUSSEIN AND THE SAUDIS IN MANNER HE SUGGESTED. FINALLY, I RAISED WITH HIM
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MATTER OF A POSSIBLE DIRECT MEETING WITH DAYAN, USING POINTS CONTAINED PARA 2 REF B. I THEN TOLD HIM I WAS READY TO CONVEY ANY OBSERVATIONS THAT HE MIGHT HAVE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMENTS I HAD MADE AND THE RESULTS OF VP MUBARAK'S TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN.

3. SADAT FIRST ADDRESSED POSSIBILITY OF A DIRECT MEETING WITH DAYAN. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD TOLD THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE PEOPLE THAT WHEN EGYPT WAS ASKED TO BREAK ITS DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL, HE HAD REFUSED TO DO SO. HIS "CONCESSION" TO NUMAYRI WAS INTENDED TO HELP THE SUDANESE PRESIDENT TO SUCCEED IN HIS MISSION. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NUMAYRI HAD NOT GOTTEN VERY FAR. HE THEN RECALLED MESSAGE CEAUSESCU HAD RECENTLY SENT TO HIM, THROUGH A SPECIAL ENVOY, INDICATING DAYAN'S DESIRE MEET SADAT (CAIRO 10386). HE HAD TOLD ROMANIANS THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTION IN PRINCIPLE, BUT THAT HE DID NOT WANT TALK SIMPLY FOR THE SAKE OF TALK, WHICH ISRAELIS WILL USE TO MISLEAD GENERAL PUBLIC BY SUGGESTING THAT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY. HE HAD, THEREFORE, SUGGESTED THAT FONMIN KAMEL WOULD BE READY TO MEET DAYAN OUTSIDE EGYPT. IF IN SUCH PRELIMINARY TALKS A DEGREE OF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED WHERE SOMETHING POSITIVE MIGHT COME OUT OF A DIRECT SADAT/DAYAN MEETING, HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO SUCH A DIRECT MEETING. SUCH A DIRECT MEETING, HE NOTED, COULD TAKE PLACE IN A THIRD COUNTRY. ASKED WHETHER THIS FORECLOSED A MEETING IN EGYPT, SADAT SAID NOT NECESSARILY, BUT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TRAVEL TO A THIRD COUNTRY FOR SUCH A MEETING IF IT SEEMED ADVISABLE. THE IMPORTANT THING, SADAT REITERATED, IS THAT SUCH A DIRECT MEETING WITH DAYAN MUST BE BASED ON CERTAIN PRELIMINARY UNDERSTANDINGS THAT SOMETHING POSITIVE CAN RESULT FROM IT. IN CONNECTION WITH HIS TIES WITH ISRAELIS, SADAT NOTED
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THAT THE ISRAELI MILITARY TEAM IS STILL IN EGYPT. IT IS NOW LOCATED IN THE GIANACLIS GUEST HOUSE.

4. SADAT THEN TURNED TO THE VP'S JUST CONCLUDED TRIP TO

SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN. THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIP, HE NOTED, HAD BEEN TWO-FOLD:

- (A) FIRST, THE ARMS PACKAGE WAS TO BE DISCUSSED. HE NOTED THAT MUBARAK HAD GONE BEFORE THE SENATE VOTE AND INDICATED HIS IDEA HAD BEEN THAT SOME UNDERSTANDING SHOULD BE REACHED, ESPECIALLY WITH THE SAUDIS, IN THE EVENT THE AIRCRAFT PACKAGE WAS REJECTED. AS IT TURNED OUT, THIS WAS UNNECESSARY. THE SAUDIS, LIKE THE EGYPTIANS, ARE DELIGHTED ABOUT THE OUTCOME. MUBARAK HAD TALKED TO THEM IN MEDINA ON THE WAY BACK FROM AMMAN AND FOUND THEM EUPHORIC ABOUT IT.

- (B) SECOND, MUBARAK WAS TO URGE KING HUSSEIN TO TAKE HIS RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PEACE NEGOTIATION. MUBARAK HAD . ALSO MADE THE POINT TO SAUDIS OF HUSSEIN'S NEED TO DO SO, SINCE--SADAT STATED--HUSSEIN ALWAYS ASKS FOR SAUDI CONCURRENCE. FAHD, ACCORDING TO SADAT, HAD AGREED WITH MUBARAK AND ASKED WHY THE ARABS SHOULD WAIT ANY LONGER TO NEGOTIATE. IF THEY DO, A DE FACTO SITUATION WILL SIMPLY ARISE IN THE WESTBANK/GAZA, WHICH WILL MAKE THE PROCESS OF GETTING THE ISRAELIS OUT MORE DIFFICULT. MUBARAK ALLEGEDLY URGED HUSSEIN TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF GETTING THE ISRAELIS TO AGREE TO RETURN THE WEST BANK TO JORDAN AND GAZA TO EGYPT FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. SINCE THE ISSUE OF "SELF-DETERMINATION" IS CREATING PROBLEMS WITH THE ISRAELIS, MUBARAK HAD SUGGESTED THAT IT BE DROPPED FOR THE TIME BEING. INSTEAD, THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE TOLD BY BOTH EGYPT AND JORDAN THAT ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967 AND BOTH COUNTRIES WOULD BE READY TO SIT WITH ISRAEL TO DISCUSS SECURITY ISSUES.

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5. MUBARAK, ON SADAT'S INSTRUCTIONS, HAD INDICATED THAT IF JORDAN WANTS EGYPT TO SIT WITH HER IN WEST BANK NEGOTIATIONS, GOE IS READY TO DO SO, BUT IS NOT ASKING FOR THISS IN FIVE YEARS TIME THE PALESTINIANS MIGHT BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO DECIDE THEIR FATE ON THE SAME PRINCIPLE GOE, HAD EARLIER DECLARED, I.E., SOME KIND OF LINK WITH JORDAN. MUBARAK HAD URGED THAT HUSSEIN NOT BE AFRAID TO ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS. EGYPT WOULD STAND WITH HIM. NOR WOULD SUCH JORDANIAN PARTICIPATION BE A VIOLATION OF THE RABAT RESOLUTIONS.

6. MUBARAK HAD FURTHER NOTED THAT IN TERMS OF ISRAELI SECURITY CONCERNS, THERE WILL HAVE TO BE ISRAELI MILITARY POINTS IN BOTH THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO ALLAY ISRAELI WORRIES. MUBARAK HAD ALSO TOLD HUSSEIN THAT IN WHATEVER FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS MAY EVENTUALLY BE WORKED OUT, EGYPT WILL BE QUITE AGREEABLE TO GAZA JOINING THE WEST BANK. MUBARAK HAD ALSO SUGGESTED TO HUSSEIN THAT REPRESENTATIVES

OF THE PALESTINIANS AND THE U.N., AS WELL AS THE U.S.,
PARTICIPATE IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

7. HUSSEIN, MUBARAK HAD REPORTED, HAD AGREED "ONE
HUNDRED PERCENT." HUSSEIN HAD ASKED ABOUT THE SAUDI
POSITION AND MUBARAK HAD CONVEYED FAHD'S VIEWS AS ALREADY
SET FORTH ABOVE. (THIS IS A CONSIDERABLY MORE POSITIVE
REPORT THAN GIVEN BY EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR ABDUL LATIF--
AMMAN 4472. I DID NOT YET HAVE THAT MESSAGE AT TIME OF
MY MEETING.) SADAT NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT HUSSEIN WILL NEED
CONTINUED PRESSURE FROM USG AND SAUDIS.

8. SADAT SAID HE IS AWARE OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S OPPOSI-
TION TO AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. FOR THIS REASONN
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HE HAD ACCEPTED THE ASWAN LANGUAGE. HE WAS HAPPY THAT THE-
IDEA OF A U.S. PROPOSAL HAD BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL JUNE.
HE HAD SEVERAL IDEAS THAT HE WISHED TO PUT FORWARD TO LAY
THE FOUNDATION OF A U.S. PROPOSAL AND RELIEVE PRESIDENT
CARTER OF PRO-ISRAELI PRESSURES. SPECIFICALLY, HIS CON-
CEPT OF A PROPER U.S. POSITION IS SOMETHING AS FOLLOWS:

- (A) ISRAEL SHOULD, IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.N.
RESOLUTION 242, WITHDRAW FROM LANDS OCCUPIED IN 1967,
PROVIDED ALL PARTIES SIT WITH ISRAELIS FOR DIRECT TALKS
AND AGREE ON MUTUAL SECURITY ISSUES.
- (B) APPROPRIATE PORTIONS OF U.N. RESOLUTION 242
RE THE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
OF EVERY STATE AND THEIR RIGHT TO LIVE WITHIN SECURE
BORDERS MIGHT BE QUOTED. (IN THIS WAY, SADAT NOTED,
THE TERM "SELF-DETERMINATION" IS AVOIDED.)
- (C) THERE SHOULD BE FULL NORMALIZATION OF RELATION8
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB CONTRACTING STATES.
(D) AN EXPRESSION OF U.S. READINESS TO USE ITS
GOOD OFFICES WITH ALL THE PARTIES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT
PEACE IN THE AREA, EVEN TO THE EXTENT OF JOINING AS A
PARTNER.

9. SUCH A PROPOSAL, SADAT NOTED, COULD EITHER BE IN THE
PROPOSED U.S. DOCUMENT OR COULD BE THE FOUNDATION OF IT
THROUGH EXCHANGES WITH THE ISRAELIS, THROUGH US, BETWEEN
NOW AND WHENEVER A U.S. DOCUMENT IS PRESENTED. BY STATING
SOMETHING ALONG THESE LINES, THE USG WILL NOT BE IMPOSING
ITSELF ON EITHER SIDE, BUT SIMPLY ASKING THE PARTIES TO
GET TOGETHER ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS. IT WOULD ALSO "RELIEVE
US" OF THE DETAILS OF THE BEGIN PLAN FOR SELF-RULE. WHY,
SADAT ASKED RHETORICALLY, SHOULD BEGIN'S SELF-RULE PLAN BE
DISCUSSED IN THE ABSENCE OF THE PALESTINIANS?

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10. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD ISRAELIS HAD ALREADY REJECTED THE BASIC ELEMENT OF HIS CONCEPT. SADAT SAID THEY HAD, BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT AN EFFORT SHOULD NOT BE MADE TO BRING THEM AROUND. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD MENTIONED THIS CONCEPT TO WEIZMAN DURING THEIR LAST MEETING. WEIZMAN HAD SAID ISRAELIS CAN NEVER MAKE A PUBLIC DECLARATION OF WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW TO THE 1967 BORDERS IN THE " WEST BANK/GAZA, BUT HAD AGREED THAT ISRAEL AND EGYPT (AND JORDAN) MIGHT SIT TOGETHER TO DISCUSS THE PERTINENT SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES REGARDING WEST BANK/GAZA. BECAUSE OF THIS STATEMENT OF HIS TO WEIZMAN, SADAT CONTENTED, DAYAN HAS NOW COME UP WITH THE IDEA OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WEST BANK/GAZA WITHOUT A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. THE ISRAELIS, HE CHARGED, WANT TO TAKE THE WHOLE BENEFIT OF HIS IDEA WITHOUT DOING THEIR PART.

11. I SAID I WAS STILL SOMEWHAT UNCLEAR ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP OF HIS PROPOSAL TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. FONMIN KAMEL HAD PREVIOUS DAY ARGUED THAT A PRIOR DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES STILL NECESSARY IF GOE IS TO DISCUSS WEST BANK/GAZA MODALITY. I NOTED THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS HAD NOT BEEN THAT CATEGORIC. SADAT RESPONDED THAT A MODIFIED PRIOR DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IS STILL NEEDED. SPECIFICALLY, ISRAEL MUST PUBLICLY AGREE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967, PROVIDED THE OTHER PARTIES SIT WITH ISRAEL TO DISCUSS MUTUAL SECURITY CONCERNS. THE CONCEPT OF "SELF-DETERMINATION," NO MATTER HOW IT IS EXPRESSED, COULD THEN BE DROPPED

12. SADAT ALSO NOTED RECENT MAARIV ARTICLE INDICATING THAT HE HAD TOLD ISRAELIS THAT HE IS WILLING TO SIGN A SEPARATE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. THIS, HE TERMED FALSE. HE SAW IT AS AN ISRAELI "BLACK PROPAGANDA" EFFORT TO TRY TO GIVE THE SECRET

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IMPRESSION THAT MORE IS GOING ON THAN IS THE CASE. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD ONCE TOLD WEIZMAN THAT IF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT PROMISED TO BRING PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST AREA, HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION. IN THE ABSENCE OF A SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, HOWEVER, HE WAS SURE THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE THE CASE. HE THEN INSTRUCTED MUBARAK TO ARRANGE THAT GOE ISSUE A STATEMENT REFUTING MAARIV STORY.

13. I THEN ASKED SADAT WHETHER ANY FURTHER THOUGHT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO REVISING EGYPTIAN COUNTER PROPOSAL FOR WEST BANK/GAZA. FONMIN KAMEL TOLD ME YESTERDAY NOTHING HAD BEEN DONE ON IT AND HE WAS TEPID ON FURTHER REVISIONS. NOTING KAMEL HAD MET WITH HIM AND MUBARAK JUST PRIOR TO

MY MEETING, SADAT SAID KAMEL HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PREPARE TWO PAPERS: (A) FIRST, AN ELABORATION ON THE EARLIER GOE PAPER AND (B) A NEW PROPOSAL BASED ON THE ABOVE CONCEPTS. THESE TWO COULD BE PRESENTED TO THE ISRAELIS AS ALTERNATIVES. KAMEL, HE THOUGHT, WOULD HAVE THE TWO DOCUMENTS READY LATE TONIGHT FOR DELIVERY TO ME. (AHMED MAHER LATER CONFIRMED THIS TO ME.)

14. SADAT SAID HE WILL BE INTERESTED IN HEARING WASHINGTON'S REACTIONS TO HIS IDEAS WHEN I RETURN. EILTS

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